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Unraveling the Lining of ERISA Health Insurer
Pockets—A Vote for National Federal Common Law
Adoption of the Make Whole Doctrine
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine the following nightmare. On a typical Monday morning
you are again driving on a congested freeway, hoping for a timely ar-
rival at your underpaid workplace. Despite considerable vehicular ob-
stacles, you eventually maneuver to the off-ramp and reach the sur-
face streets that lead to your office. As you approach the last
intersection before turning into your office parking lot, you experi-
ence the final seconds of the last typical Monday you will ever have
because a split second later, the driver of a 1985 Dodge Ram Truck,
while looking below his dashboard for a dropped cigarette, speeds
through a mature red light at 50 mph directly into the driver’s side
of your car.
One life flight, four surgeries, and several weeks later, you real-
ize, while lying in a hospital bed, that you are grateful to be alive.
You muse to yourself that shortly before your accident you had
griped to your spouse that paying car and health insurance premiums
was like throwing money out the window, since you had never
benefited from either. You do some quick calculations in your head.
Since you have been paying your own premiums, for about ten years,
you have paid nearly $50,000 in car and health insurance premiums
without receiving anything in return. Now, despite unfortunate cir-
cumstances, you have finally received your bittersweet payday. Your
health insurance has already paid out over $100,000 for your medi-
cal treatment. You have a year’s worth of physical therapy staring you
in the face, another potential surgery, and at least nine months of
lost wages.
You also feel some justification in your inspired decision to in-
crease your uninsured motorist coverage as the driver of the ‘85 Ram
was uninsured, to go along with his lack of a valid driver’s license.
The $100,000 car insurance policy will come in handy as you strug-
gle to pay bills and make ends meet while you are unable to work.
Between meeting your normal monthly obligations and funding your
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newly acquired medical necessities, you figure that the insurance
proceeds will sustain you for about a year while you literally get back
on your feet.
Given the fact that your case has been conservatively valued at
$300,000, your car insurance company quickly settles for the
$100,000 policy limit on your uninsured motorist policy. Unfortu-
nately, unbeknownst to you, your nightmare has just begun. Your
health insurance carrier has filed a lien on the entire proceeds of the
settlement. Initially you are puzzled—why have you been paying
health insurance premiums if you have to pay the entire cost of your
treatment anyway?
You hire an attorney who specializes in resolving dilemmas such
as the one you are specifically facing. She explains that state law pre-
scribes that until an injured party is “made whole,” or is compen-
sated for the entirety of his damages, a health insurance company has
no right to reimbursement for payment of medical treatments. There
is, however, an important caveat. If a health plan qualifies as an
ERISA (Employee Retirement Income Security Act) plan, it can pre-
empt state law, including state law considerations of whether a victim
has been made whole.
Your health insurance plan is unquestionably an ERISA plan.
The legal counsel for your health insurer relies on the ERISA caveat
and is unwilling to negotiate a settlement. Litigation ensues. Despite
your attorney’s best efforts, the trial court finds that the subrogation
clause in your health insurance contract is sufficient to provide your
health insurer with first priority to your settlement monies. The en-
tire $100,000 from your auto policy settlement goes to your health
insurer. Befuddled and dazed, and despite a decade’s worth of faith-
ful insurance premium payments, you are left with physical and
emotional scars and nothing from your auto policy settlement with
which to pay your day-to-day expenses, your newly amassed attorney
bill, your future medical treatment, and lost wages. Instead of being
“made whole” through the security blanket of insurance, you have
been callously and indifferently dumped into an insurance-“made
hole” of financial despair. Congratulations, you have been properly
initiated into the cruel world of insurance subrogation claims.
The foregoing and admittedly long-winded hypothetical situa-
tion provides an alarming, yet realistic, introduction to the legal
Scylla and Charybdis between which personal injury victims all too
often find themselves. The purpose of this note is to discuss the in-
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herent problems with ERISA subrogation claims, to analyze con-
trasting circuit court positions on the subject in light of the intent
behind ERISA and insurance contracts in general, and to propose a
new paradigm within which personal injury subrogation claims may
be more equitably adjudicated.
Part II of this note purveys a brief history of insurance subroga-
tion claims and of the applicability of ERISA, providing a context for
the factual and analytical posture of the court in the recently decided
federal district court case, In re Paris,1 described in Part III. Part IV
reveals the ideological, methodological, and legal shortcomings of
the current circuits favoring ERISA subrogation over the “make
whole doctrine” as exposed in Paris. It then proposes a new standard
by which subrogation claims may be determined in light of legislative
intent and simple principles of equity. Finally, Part V of this note
concludes that the current circuits favoring subrogation do so with-
out solid legal foundation and at the expense of equity. Rather fo-
cusing on making an injured party “whole” is not only in harmony
with the fundamental principles underlying our legal system, but also
in no way places an unfair legal burden upon would-be health insur-
ance subrogee.
II. BACKGROUND
In order to fairly evaluate the interplay between subrogation and
the make whole doctrine, this note will briefly address the historical
background of subrogation. The general evolution of subrogation in
insurance law and in ERISA qualified plans has set the stage for the
current controversy between health insurers and personal injury
victims.
A. The Roots of Subrogation
As it applies to personal injury and insurance law, subrogation is
a principle whereby an insurer who has indemnified an insured may
assume legal standing in place of the insured to sue a third-party
tortfeasor on the insured’s claim for compensation.2 Initially banned
from application to personal injury claims by (1) the public policy
disfavoring the assignment of personal injury claims and (2) judicial
1. 44 F. Supp. 2d 747 (D. Md. 1999).
2. See generally BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 995 (6th ed. 1991).
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efficiency policy prohibiting the division of a cause of action, subro-
gation invidiously began to worm its way into insurance contracts in
the 1960s.3 By couching policy language in the loophole terms of
“reimbursement” instead of “subrogation,”4 insurers were able to
make an end run around the letter of the law. However, the practical
and economic effect of plan language often resulted in a conven-
tional subrogation application.
This process was clearly borne out in Lee v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co.,5 where a California state court upheld the
following State Farm Insurance policy language:
[I]f requested in writing by the company . . . such [injured] person
shall take, through any representative designated by the company,
such action as may be necessary or appropriate to recover such
payment as damages from such other person or organization, such
action to be taken in the name of such person; in the event of a re-
covery, the company shall be reimbursed out of such recovery for
expenses, costs and attorneys’ fees incurred by it in connection
therewith . . . .6
In a “reluctant” concurring opinion, Justice Friedman conceded
that the cases upon which the court relied “represent a creeping ero-
sion of the anti-subrogation principle established at common
law . . . . The successive amendments of State Farm’s ‘reimburse-
ment’ clauses illustrate how eagerly and quickly the disingenuous
draftsmen of insurance policies move into the gaps created by deci-
sional erosion . . . .”7 Justice Friedman concluded by stating that
“[t]he cumulative effect of the policy provisions is to create the eco-
nomic reality of subrogation to the personal injury claim without its
language.”8
3. See Roger M. Baron, Subrogation: A Pandora’s Box Awaiting Closure, 41 S.D. L.
REV. 237, 239 (1996).
4. In basic terms, subrogation allows an insurer to step into the shoes of an insured and
sue a third party tortfeasor for recovery of compensation, where the insured does not initiate
such an action herself. With true reimbursement, however, an insurer relies on the injured in-
sured to take action against the third party and can only recover out of whatever proceeds the
insured is able to procure. For the purpose of this note, the distinction between the two con-
cepts will not be further discussed.
5. 129 Cal. Rptr. 271, 274 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).
6. Id. at 274.
7. Id. at 278.
8. Id.
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On a practical level, subrogation clauses have been justified by
insurers in two ways. First, insurers posit that subrogation serves to
reduce insurance rates. Second, insurers have piously promoted the
argument that an insured should not “unduly benefit from a loss and
thereby enjoy a ‘double recovery’ from both the insurer and the
tortfeasor.”9 In short, insurers claim that “[s]ubrogation prevents an
insured from obtaining one recovery from the insurer under its con-
tractual obligations and a second recovery from the tortfeasor under
general tort principles.”10
B. Subrogation in the ERISA Context
Despite a conspicuous absence of statutory language and legisla-
tive directive, subrogation has played a major role in cases involving
ERISA health insurers. The following discussion will not attempt to
unravel all of the convoluted complexities of ERISA applications in
health benefit situations, but rather will provide a simple framework
within which to understand ERISA subrogation cases.
1. Introduction
In terms of general legal foundation, insurers seek to bring sub-
rogation claims under ERISA based on a theory of unjust enrich-
ment. Even if states have embraced laws applying a make whole
doctrine, ERISA, in certain circumstances, preempts state law that
may be more favorable to the injured party.
Subject to some exceptions, any state law relating to subrogation
rights is preempted by ERISA if the subrogation rights are part of an
employee benefit plan.11 Hence, the first step in ERISA subrogation
analysis is to determine whether a plan is an employee benefit plan.
Even if such a plan is identified, certain state laws may yet be exempt
from ERISA preemption under the “savings” clause (where certain
laws are “saved” from preemption) if the state law “regulates insur-
ance.”12 In determining whether a state law regulates insurance,
ERISA also includes a “deemer” clause,13 which prevents a court
9. Baron, supra note 3, at 241.
10. Id. at 241 n.30 (quoting Elaine M. Rinaldi, Apportionment of Recovery Between In-
sured and Insurer in a Subrogation Case, 29 TORT & INS. L.J. 803, 803 (1994)).
        11.   See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994).
12. See id. § 1144(b)(2)(A).
13. See id. § 1144(b)(2)(B).
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from “deeming” a plan to be an insurance company unless it truly
fits the mold of such a company.14 Although it is beyond the scope
of this note to conduct a detailed analysis of ERISA preemption, in
order to provide proper background, the key elements will be briefly
addressed below.
2. Employee benefit plans
Based on statutory language found within ERISA, an employee
benefit plan is defined as follows:
The terms “employee welfare benefit plan” and “welfare plan”
mean any plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or is here-
after established or maintained by an employer or by an employee
organization, or by both, to the extent that such plan, fund, or
program was established or is maintained for the purpose of pro-
viding for its participants or their beneficiaries, through the pur-
chase of insurance or otherwise, (A) medical, surgical, or hospital
care or benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, dis-
ability, death or unemployment . . . .15
Most challenges to the existence of an ERISA employee benefit
plan focus on whether “(1) a plan was ‘established or maintained;’
(2) by an ‘employer’ or ‘employee organization;’ and whether (3)
the plan covers ‘employees.’ ”16
a. “Established or maintained.” Federal courts generally recog-
nize that an employee benefit plan has been established or main-
tained by objectively identifying intended benefits, class of benefici-
aries, source of financing, and procedures for receiving benefits.17 In
the Ninth Circuit, a plan meeting the foregoing qualifications can
only be excluded from ERISA coverage if all of the following four
qualifications are met:
(1) The employer makes no contributions;
(2) Employee participation in the program is completely volun-
tary;
(3) The sole functions of the employer are to “permit the insurer
14. See generally 3 EMPLOYMENT COORDINATOR ¶¶ B-10,511-10,514 (Jennifer L.
Howicz et al. eds., 1999).
15. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
16. Karra J. Porter, Subrogation by Health Insurers Under ERISA 2 (Feb. 22, 1996)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
17. See id.
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to publicize the program to employees or members, to collect pre-
miums through payroll deductions or dues checkoffs and to remit
them to the insurer;”18 and
(4) The employer receives no consideration other than reason-
able compensation for administrative services “actually rendered in
connection with payroll deductions or dues checkoffs.”19
In practice, proof that a plan has been established almost always
equates with the existence of an employee benefit plan because the
showing of “employer” and “employee,” addressed below, is gener-
ally a foregone conclusion.
b. “Employer or employer organization” and “employee.” ERISA
defines an employer as “any person acting directly as an employer, or
indirectly in the interest of an employer, in relation to an employee
benefit plan.”20 Based on this broad language, this standard will eas-
ily be met in a majority of cases.21 Likewise, the standard for identi-
fying an “employee” under ERISA requires only a minimal showing
based on common law principles of agency.22
3. The “savings” and “deemer” clauses
Once a court identifies the existence of an employee benefit plan,
ERISA preempts state laws applying to the plan unless the savings
clause removes them from the grasp of ERISA. In essence, the sav-
ings clause “saves” state laws which regulate insurance from ERISA
preemption. The state law must do more than impact the insurance
industry to meet this qualification; it must specifically address the in-
surance industry.23
The ERISA deemer clause applies in this setting.24 In essence, it
is an exception to the savings clause exception. The deemer clause
prohibits a court from simply deeming a plan to be an insurance
company when it does not fit the traditional mold. Generally,
deemer clause questions are easily resolved. If benefits are provided
exclusively by a “traditional” insurance company, the plan passes
18. PacifiCare Inc. v. Martin, 34 F.3d 834, 837 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Kanne v. Con-
necticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 867 F.2d 489, 492 (9th Cir. 1988)).
19. Id.
20. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(5).
21. See Porter, supra note 16, at 5.
22. See id.
23. See id. at 8.
24. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B).
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muster and is subject to savings clause analysis. If, however, benefits
are provided by a self-insured sponsor, the deemer clause applies and
no savings clause analysis is necessary.
4. Subrogation provisions in ERISA plans
Currently, once an insurer has successfully proved the preemptive
power of ERISA, its odds of recovering vis-à-vis reimbursement or
subrogation are good. Insurers will generally be able to seek reim-
bursement under ERISA § 502(a)(3), which states that “[a] civil ac-
tion may be brought . . . (3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduci-
ary . . . to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such
violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this title or the terms of
the plan.”25 The principle of equitable relief relating to subrogation
claims is unjust enrichment. Generally, adequately worded reim-
bursement and subrogation provisions are enforced under ERISA.26
5. ERISA subrogation summary
In sum, in a dispute between an insurer and an injured insured,
the ability to bring an ERISA claim for subrogation is often the de-
terminative factor in a successful recovery by the insurer. In many
cases, however, despite acknowledging that a plan is an ERISA plan,
the insured argues that the make whole doctrine, outside the pa-
rameters of state law, is an exception to ERISA preemption. That is
the focus of this note. Thus, the pertinent issue is whether the make
whole doctrine should prevail, even if ERISA applies, in circum-
stances where insurers seek subrogation of third-party settlements of
insureds who, if required to reimburse their medical plan, will be left
with less than adequate compensation for their injuries.
III. IN RE PARIS
The conflicting convergence of subrogation principles and the
make whole doctrine was recently illustrated in a Maryland federal
district court case, In re Paris.27
25. Id. § 1132(a)(3).
26. See Porter, supra note 16, at 15.
27. 44 F. Supp. 2d 747 (D. Md. 1999).
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A. The Facts
In June 1996, Shawn Paris (“Paris”), then twenty-four years old,
went for an afternoon motorcycle ride. His ride ended prematurely
when he was struck by a negligent driver. Paris was severely injured,
and his ensuing medical treatment totaled over $100,000. The liti-
gation arising from Paris’s accident resulted in a $100,000 settle-
ment with the third-party insurance carrier.28 The language in Paris’s
health insurance plan with Iron Workers’ Trust Fund (the “Fund”)
reads as follows:
The Fund’s subrogation right is established by the Plan . . . . Once
the Third Party’s liability is resolved, you will be required to reim-
burse the Fund up to the full amount of the recovery for the full
amount of loss of time benefits and/or medical benefits re-
ceived . . . . By accepting benefits from the Fund, the insured per-
son agrees that any amounts recovered by the insured person by
judgment, settlement or otherwise will be first applied to reimburse
the fund.29
Paris filed a petition in Maryland state court seeking a declaration
that the make whole doctrine superceded the subrogation language
and rights described in the excerpt of the plan above. The petition
was removed to federal district court under the preemptive sweep of
ERISA and was subsequently amended.30
In pertinent part, the petition noted that even without losing the
$100,000 to subrogation, Paris would not be made whole and,
therefore, should be spared from the grasp of the Fund’s subrogation
language. The petition further stated that in light of the fact that
Paris suffered permanent brain damage and qualified statutorily as a
disabled, destitute adult, the $100,000 settlement should be accessi-
ble to Paris’s mother (who, as a result of Paris’ injuries, became his
legal guardian) to expense the fifty-one years of Paris’s determined
remaining life expectancy.31
        28.  See id. at 748.
29. Id.
30. See id.
31. See id.
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B. The Reasoning of the Court
In its memorandum opinion, the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland prefaced its “reasoning” by definitively
stating that “[n]o further briefing or oral argument is needed . . . as
the motion raises only a legal issue that, albeit one of first impression
in this District and Circuit, is clearly settled by weight of persuasive
authority.”32 In less than one page of analysis, the court, after cor-
rectly recognizing that the issue at bar fell under the purview of
ERISA, cited only one case in direct support of its proposition that
“[t]he majority of Circuit Court cases that have dealt with the issue
hold that even a ‘boilerplate’ subrogation clause can override the
‘make whole doctrine.’ ”33
After acknowledging that the Eleventh Circuit had adopted case
law to the contrary and that its own circuit (the Fourth Circuit) had
not yet spoken to the issue, the court stated that it was “of the
opinion that the plan language at issue [in the current case] abso-
lutely rules out any application of the ‘make whole doctrine’ ” and
therefore, “[b]ased on the clear and unequivocal language of the
plan at issue [in the current case], there is absolutely no question
that the petition in th[e] case must be denied.”34
The practical result of the court’s decision was that the remain-
der of the $100,000 settlement (after a legal contingency fee had
been deducted) was to be paid to the Fund while Ms. Paris and her
adult, destitute child were left with nothing other than the remain-
der of the Fund bill debt and years of future financial challenges.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Placing In re Paris in a Proper Legal Context—A View from Four
Circuits
Despite what appears to be, on its face, a blatantly inequitable re-
sult in Paris, the Maryland federal court’s decision harmoniously
blends in with existing circuit court holdings. Four circuits have re
cently addressed the issue of subrogation in personal injury cases to
either the detriment or extinction of the make whole rule.
32. Id.
33. Id. (citing Cutting v. Jerome Foods, Inc., 993 F.2d 1293, 1297 (7th Cir. 1993)).
34. Id. at 748-49.
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1. The Fifth Circuit—Sunbeam-Oster Co. Group Benefits Plan v.
Whitehurst
In Sunbeam, Leonard Whitehurst Jr. was severely injured when
an eighteen-wheel tractor/trailer negligently collided with his car.35
Based upon health coverage provided by his wife’s employee benefit
plan (the “Plan”), under which Whitehurst was also covered, White-
hurst received $137,000 in medical benefits. Whitehurst subse-
quently settled his tort claim against the vehicle owner for the vehicle
owner’s insurance policy limit of $500,000.36 After several unsuc-
cessful attempts by the plan administrator to obtain reimbursement
for the $137,000 it had already paid for Whitehurst’s medical bills, it
filed suit against Whitehurst.37
The district court held in favor of Whitehurst, reasoning that the
Plan language did not address the circumstance where a beneficiary
only partially recovers his damages from a third party.38 The court,
after officially adopting the make whole rule39 as a matter of federal
common law, found that Whitehurst had suffered damages of $2
million, and his wife and child together had suffered an additional
35. See Sunbeam-Oster Co. Group Benefits Plan v. Whitehurst, 102 F.3d 1368, 1369-
70 (5th Cir. 1996).
36. See id. at 1370.
37. See id. at 1372. The language upon which the Plan relied is as follows:
The Plan has subrogation and reimbursement provisions which allow the Plan
to recover for benefits it pays which are duplicated from another source. The Plan
provides an automatic lien on any funds subject to reimbursement or subrogation.
Reimbursement gives the Plan the right to collect from you money that you
receive in a settlement or lawsuit that covers expenses that the Plan has already paid
for . . . .
Reimbursement Example—You are injured and receive $1,000 in covered ex-
penses from the Plan. The person who caused your injury agrees to settle with you
and pays you the $1,000. The Sunbeam-Oster Plan has a legal right to reimburse-
ment from you of the $1,000.
Id. at 1371.
38. See id. at 1372.
39. See id. The district court specified that the make whole rule would apply as a default
rule of plan language construction. See id. The Fifth Circuit described the make whole doctrine
as follows:
In essence, the Make Whole rule is the diametric opposite of the Plan Priority rule:
In the former, a plan gets no reimbursement until the beneficiary has been made
whole; in the latter, the beneficiary retains nothing until he has reimbursed the plan
(or the plan has recovered through subrogation) all funds expended on medical
costs of the beneficiary, dollar for dollar.
Id.
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$500,000 in damages.40
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit determined that the Plan language
was unambiguous:
[I]n the absence of any expressly selected alternative standard (such
as Pro-Rata or Make Whole) which deviates from the anticipated
Plan Priority norm—such language vested the Plan with an uncon-
ditional and unequivocal Plan Priority right to reimbursement for
the full amount of the medical benefits it paid on a participant’s
behalf . . . .41
Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit reversed the decision of the lower
court, instructing it to enter a judgment directing Whitehurst to
“reimburse the Plan, dollar for dollar, for all qualifying expenditures
made on his behalf, as well as for all expenditures of such nature that
the Plan might make in the future.”42
In dicta, the Fifth Circuit felt obliged to specifically address the
make whole issue spawned by the district court decision, describing
the issue as its “most serious concern.”43 In no uncertain terms, the
Fifth Circuit gave a crushing blow to the future viability of the make
whole doctrine, stating that “we have serious doubts whether we
would ever approve or adopt the make whole rule as this circuit’s
default rule for the priority of recovery in reimbursement or subro-
gation between an ERISA plan and its participant or beneficiary un-
der circumstances such as the ones we consider today.”44
2. The Seventh Circuit—Cutting v. Jerome Foods, Inc.
In Cutting, Diane Cutting incurred $90,000 in medical expenses
after suffering serious injuries in an automobile accident.45 After
Cutting successfully brought a claim against an uninsured-motorist
policy and a products liability claim, Cutting’s ERISA benefit plan
(the “Plan”) sought reimbursement for its payment of medical ex-
penses.46 Cutting, based on the make whole doctrine (she alleged
40. See id.
41. Id. at 1376.
42. Id. at 1379.
43. Id. at 1377.
44. Id. at 1378.
45. See Cutting v. Jerome Foods, Inc., 993 F.2d 1293, 1294 (7th Cir. 1993).
46. See id. at 1294-95. The Plan language stated that “the Plan shall be subrogated to
all claims, demands, actions and rights of recovery of the individual against any third party or
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that her recoveries still left her nearly $400,000 from being made
whole), refused to reimburse the Plan.47 The Plan then successfully
moved for summary judgment in its legal pursuit of the $90,000.48
On appeal, Judge Richard Posner, writing for the Seventh Cir-
cuit, focused the overwhelming majority of his opinion on the ques-
tion of whether the court should “adopt a federal common law rule
to the effect that rights of subrogation are enforceable only after the
plan beneficiary has been made whole for the loss giving rise to the
claim for benefits.”49 In a lengthy description, comprising over half
of his opinion, Judge Posner described subrogation as a “good
thing,”50 a principle, when practically applied, that serves to shift risk
of recovery “from the individual to a specialist in bearing risk and
enforcing claims—the insurance company.”51 According to Judge
Posner, the result of controlled risk is that insureds save money on
insurance policies while conceding only the opportunity to receive
“double recovery.”52 Judge Posner further analogized subrogation to
the assignment of an insured’s tort claim, which serves to shift “the
insured’s tort rights to the insurance company, reduc[ing] the price
of insurance and thus enabl[ing] the insured to obtain more cover-
age, in effect trading an uncertain bundle of tort rights for a larger
certain right, which is just the sort of trade that people seek through
insurance.”53
After Judge Posner’s discourse on the merits of subrogation, he
concluded by admitting that the “subrogation” versus “make whole
controversy” did not need to be decided in the case at hand
“[b]ecause, as the Cuttings concede, the make-whole rule is just a
principle of interpretation, it can be overridden by clear language in
the plan.”54 In holding that the Plan language was clear, the Seventh
any insurer, including the Workers’ Compensation, to the extent of any and all payments made
or to be made hereunder by the Plan.” Id. at 1295.
47. See id. at 1295.
48. See id. at 1294-95.
49. Id. at 1296.
50. Id. at 1298.
51. Id. at 1297.
52. See id. at 1297-98.
53. Id. at 1298.
54. Id. at 1298-99.
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Circuit affirmed the summary judgment decision of the lower court,
and Cutting was ordered to reimburse her health insurance plan.55
3. The Ninth Circuit—Barnes v. Independent Automobile Dealers
Association of California Health and Welfare Benefit Plan
A glimmer of hope for the make whole doctrine was conceived in
Barnes v. Independent Automobile Dealers Association of California
Health and Welfare Benefit Plan.56 In Barnes, after being rear-ended
by Catherine Clark in an automobile accident, Susan Barnes incurred
medical bills of $23,075.40.57 In January 1991, Barnes filed suit
against Clark for, inter alia, payment of Barnes’s medical bills.58
Shortly thereafter, Barnes submitted an accident claim form to her
health plan (the “Plan”) for payment of her medical bills.59 The Plan,
citing its subrogation clause in the benefit agreement, denied pay-
ment because of Barnes’s pending litigation against Clark.60 Barnes
eventually recovered $25,000 from Clark (the liability limit of
Clark’s insurance policy) and $5,000 from Barnes’s own automobile
insurance policy.61
In August 1992, Barnes filed suit against the Plan for payment of
her outstanding medical bills ($18,075.40) plus interest.62 Despite
an affidavit indicating that her claim was valued at a minimum of
$65,000, the federal district court granted the Plan’s motion for
summary judgment.63
55. See id. at 1299.
56. 64 F.3d 1389 (9th Cir. 1995).
57. See id. at 1391.
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. See id. at 1392. The Plan language read as follows:
This plan may withhold payment of benefits when a party other than the employee
or dependent may be liable for expenses until liability is legally determined. How-
ever, if this plan makes payment which the employee, dependent or any other party
is or may be entitled to recover against any person or organization responsible for an
accident or illness, this Plan is subrogated to all rights of recovery to the extent of its
payment. The employee, dependent, or other person or organization receiving pay-
ment from this Plan shall execute and deliver instruments and papers and do what-
ever else is necessary to secure such rights to the Plan, and shall do nothing either
before or after payment by the Plan to prejudice such rights.
Id. at 1393 (italics omitted).
61. See id. at 1392.
62. See id.
63. See id.
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On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of
summary judgment and remanded for an entry of judgment direct-
ing the Plan to pay for Barnes’s outstanding medical expenses.64 In
reaching its conclusion, the federal appellate court noted that the
make whole doctrine was “supported by substantial authority in ex-
isting insurance law, and it is consistent with ERISA’s purpose of
protecting participants in employee benefit plans.”65 The Ninth Cir-
cuit further stated: “We adopt as federal common law this generally
accepted rule that, in the absence of a clear contract provision to the
contrary, an insured must be made whole before an insurer can en-
force its right to subrogation.”66 However, despite this apparently
definitive stance taken by the Ninth Circuit, its potency was some-
what diluted by the court’s ensuing analysis of the Plan’s language.
In response to the Plan’s argument that the subrogation language of
“all rights of recovery” barred application of the make whole rule,
the Ninth Circuit differentiated the case from those that had found
references to “any” or “all” rights in subrogation clauses sufficient to
trump the make whole doctrine.67 The court noted that those cases
involved situations where an insurance company had already paid an
insured’s claim, or where a plan bestowed discretion upon its ad-
ministrator to interpret plan provisions.68
So, in short, what first appeared to be a major victory for propo-
nents of the make whole doctrine turned out to be a much-less-than-
definitive position by the Ninth Circuit. Based on the Ninth Circuit’s
holding in Barnes, subrogation clauses effectively demolish the make
whole doctrine in circumstances where a plan has already paid an in-
sured’s medical bills or where a plan vests discretion in its adminis-
trator, both of which arguably constitute a healthy majority of sub-
rogation disputes.
64. See id. at 1397.
65. Id. at 1394-95 (citing Batchelor v. Oak Hill Med. Group, 870 F.2d 1446, 1449
(9th Cir. 1989) and Guy v. Southeastern Iron Workers’ Welfare Fund, 877 F.2d 37, 39-40
(11th Cir. 1989)).
66. Id. at 1395 (emphasis added).
67. See id. at 1396.
68. See id.
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4. The Eleventh Circuit—Cagle v. Bruner
The most conclusive circuit court position on the make whole
doctrine arose in Cagle v. Bruner.69 In Cagle, Cobbie Bruner Jr. re-
ceived emergency medical treatment after being involved in a car ac-
cident caused by a third party.70 The Retail, Wholesale and Depart-
ment Store International Union and Industry Health and Benefit
Fund (the “Fund”), under coverage held by Cobbie’s mother,
Nancy Bruner, paid an initial medical claim of $296.00.71 However,
the Fund refused to pay any additional claims in connection with
Cobbie’s four-month hospitalization and subsequent four-month
outpatient treatment until Nancy Bruner signed a standard subroga-
tion form.72
Bruner signed the form, but attached an addendum indicating
that the signed agreement did not “in any way expand the subroga-
tion rights” of the Fund.73 The Fund rejected Bruner’s addendum
and again sent an original copy of the agreement to Bruner who
again returned it with an identical addendum.74 The Fund then filed
suit against Bruner, seeking declaratory judgment requiring a signed
unmodified standard subrogation agreement as a condition to pay-
ment of Cobbie Bruner’s medical claims and injunctive relief order-
69. 112 F.3d 1510 (11th Cir. 1997).
70. See id. at 1513.
71. See id.
72. See id. The Fund’s subrogation form read as follows:
I (we) understand that if payments are made under the Plan for any treatment or
services because of injury to, or sickness of, an eligible individual who has a lawful
claim, demand or right against a third party or parties (including an insurance car-
rier) for indemnification, damages or other payment with respect to such injury or
sickness, I (we) am (are) required to subrogate to the RWDSU Health and Welfare
Fund, the Plan, to the extent of payments made under said plan, my (our) rights to
receive or claim such indemnification, damages or other payment. . . .
In consideration thereof, if payments are made under said plan for treatment or
service on account of the same injury or sickness and to the extent of such payments
made (but not in excess of the proceeds of any recovery),
(a) I (we) agree to reimburse the Plan in full from the proceeds of any recovery
received by me (us) because of such injury or sickness, and
(b) The Plan shall be subrogated in full to my (our) rights to such recovery and
my (our) interest in the proceeds of such recovery;
if such recovery is based upon the eligible individual’s lawful claim, demand or right
against a third party or parties (including an insurance carrier).
Id.
73. Id.
74. See id.
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ing Bruner to execute the agreement.75 Bruner counterclaimed
seeking a declaration that Cobbie Bruner be made whole before the
Fund could participate in any recovery from a third party, a judg-
ment for the amount of medical expenses covered by the Fund, and
costs and attorneys’ fees.76 The district court granted Bruner’s mo-
tion for summary judgment, and the Fund was eventually required to
pay $56,744.57 of Cobbie Bruner’s medical bills.77
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit addressed the issue of “whether
the ‘make whole’ doctrine applies where an ERISA plan neither ex-
plicitly adopts nor disavows the doctrine.”78 In formally recognizing
the make whole doctrine as a default rule in ERISA cases, the court
stated: “[T]he make whole doctrine applies to limit a plan’s subro-
gation rights where an insured has not received compensation for his
total loss and the plan does not explicitly preclude operation of the
doctrine.”79 The court proceeded to reject the plan administrator
limitation noted in both Barnes80 and Cutting,81 indicating that a
plan could not avoid application of the make whole doctrine merely
by “giving itself discretion” to do so.82
In short, with regard to the make whole doctrine, Cagle estab-
lished the following premise: “Either the make whole doctrine is im-
plied into the plan (the default scenario), or it is not (if there is clear
language rejecting it). There is no interpretive question for [a] Fund
to consider.”83 While Cagle provided a basis for enforcement of the
make whole doctrine in ERISA plans, it left the door open for
ERISA plans to simply insert language expressly rejecting the make
whole doctrine.
75. See id. at 1513-14.
76. See id. at 1514.
77. See id.
78. Id. at 1512.
79. Id. at 1521 (italics omitted).
80. See Barnes v. Independent Auto. Dealers Ass’n of Cal. Health and Welfare Benefit
Plan, 64 F.3d 1389, 1395 (9th Cir. 1995). See supra Part IV.A.3.
81. See Cutting v. Jerome Foods, Inc., 993 F.2d 1293, 1299 (7th Cir. 1993). See supra
Part IV.A.2.
82. Cagle, 112 F.3d at 1522.
83. Id.
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B. The Flawed Foundation of Subrogation in the ERISA Health Plan
Context
A composite summary of circuit court discourse reveals that the
triumph of subrogation principles has come at the expense of proper
consideration of legislative intent in enacting ERISA and correct ad-
judicative analysis of the issues of insurance savings and double re-
covery by insureds. Faulty analysis of these key factors has led to an
unjustified deference given by courts to the concept of subrogation.
1. Legislative intent in enacting ERISA
Perhaps the initial inquiry in determining the validity of subro-
gation in an ERISA plan setting should be, “Is that what Congress
intended?” The legislative history of ERISA reveals that Congress
was, in large part, motivated by “the absolute need that safeguards
for plan participants be sufficiently adequate and effective to prevent
the numerous inequities to workers under plans which have resulted
in tragic hardship to so many.”84 The clear focus of ERISA intent
was on its intended beneficiaries, the “workers.”
Furthermore, ERISA provisions do not speak at all to the issue of
a health insurance plan’s right to subrogation. At best, “ERISA does
not preclude a self-insured medical plan from enforcing a subroga-
tion provision contained in the plan against a participant.”85
Because of ERISA’s silence on the topic of subrogation, federal
common law has governed subrogation right enforcement in ERISA
welfare benefit plans.86 Not only has federal common law belied the
intent of ERISA legislators, it has generally coupled the lack of
ERISA subrogation preclusion with the broad discretion of plan
trustees to establish protocol of plan eligibility and participation, up-
holding subrogation claims even in the face of numerous inequities to
workers under plans which have resulted in tragic hardship.
2. The “double recovery” myth
One of the most commonly advanced rationales for the existence
of subrogation is that an insured should not benefit from an injury
beyond being made whole. In other words, the policy against double
84. H.R. REP. NO. 93-533, at 9 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4647.
85. 3 EMPLOYMENT COORDINATOR, supra note 14, ¶ B-13,003.
86. See id.
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recovery dictates that an injured insured should not be able to re-
ceive fully compensating benefits by way of his or her insurance con-
tract and then “come out ahead” by suing a third-party tortfeasor.
The theoretical basis for subrogation, then, is that the insured
benefits from immediate indemnification by the health insurer for
losses sustained at the hands of a third-party tortfeasor. Based on the
policy justification that a tortfeasor should not benefit from the in-
demnification act of the injured’s insurer, subrogation allows the in-
surer to “stand in the shoes” of the insured and recover whatever
amount has been indemnified.87 Any dollar figure over the indemni-
fication amount must go to the insured. According to insurers, dou-
ble recovery occurs when an insured is made whole by his or her
health insurance policy and then receives full compensation again
from the tortfeasor. By way of mathematical analogy, if the insured
begins on the number line at “1” (one—representing “wholeness”),
moves to “0” (zero) as a result of the tortfeasor’s actions, back to
“1” (one) by way of the health insurance policy and then to “2”
(two) as a result of a recovery from the tortfeasor, the insured has
allegedly “benefited” from the injury.
However, some commentators have noted that a post-recovery
result of “+2” on the number line is unproblematic.88 For example,
the collateral source rule requires a tortfeasor to pay the full liability
of damages caused even if the victim was sufficiently wise to procure
insurance.89 In this context, then, the commentators question why
an insured victim should be limited to the same overall recovery as
an imprudent uninsured victim.90 Some courts have pondered the
same question. In Lee v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co. (discussed in Part II), Justice Friedman’s concurrence discredited
the double recovery theory as follows:
The defendant insurance company argues that these [subrogation]
clauses prevent double recovery. A liability insurance policy is a
piece of merchandise. In a free society an individual may go out
and buy and keep all the merchandise he desires. The question is
not whether the policyholder is recovering from two sources, but
whether the insurance company is supplying the merchandise for
87. See Baron, supra note 3, at 241-42.
88. See id. at 242.
89. See id.
90. See id. at 243.
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which it exacted a premium. The double recovery argument is singu-
larly unmoving.91
Similarly, in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Druke,92 the Arizona Su-
preme Court noted that imposing reimbursement obligations upon
an injured policyholder would result in denying the well-deserved
“benefits of his thrift and foresight.” 93
It is worthy of mention that although this note does not argue
for the institution of “double recovery” by insureds, the denial of full
recovery from both the insurer and the tortfeasor almost always re-
sults in a double recovery by the insurer. The insurer recovers once
through premiums and a second time through reimbursement from
the tortfeasor. The insurer’s second recovery, then, will always come
at the expense of either a full or a second recovery by the insured. It
is highly debatable that public policy would favor placing an addi-
tional windfall into the pockets of an insurance company rather than
into the hands of an injured individual.
3. The “insurance savings” myth
Another widely held justification for the existence of subrogation
in the health insurance context is that subrogation ultimately pro-
tects the insurance “consumer” by lowering the cost of insurance
premiums. However, if subrogation savings truly are passed on to in-
sureds, the analysis in the previous section fails. In other words, if in-
surance premiums reflect actuarization for subrogation payments,
then insurers could stake a rightful claim upon amounts beyond that
required to make an insured whole. If premiums reflect discounts
due to potential subrogation, allowing an insured to recover from
both an insurer and a tortfeasor would be, in essence, a triple recov-
ery—a recovery from the lower premiums paid, a recovery from the
health insurance benefits, and a recovery from the tortfeasor.
However, despite this proposition advanced by insurers, pre-
mium calculations do not reflect potential subrogation collections.94
In fact, “[i]nsurers consistently fail to introduce the factor of such
recoveries into rate-determining formulae, but rather apply such re-
91. Lee v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 129 Cal. Rptr. 271, 278 (Cal. Ct. App.
1976) (emphasis added).
92. 576 P.2d 489 (Ariz. 1978).
93. Id. at 492.
94. See JOHN F. DOBBYN, INSURANCE LAW IN A NUTSHELL 284 (3d ed. 1996).
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coveries to increasing dividends to shareholders.”95 The considera-
tion of subrogation is conspicuously absent from the following list of
factors used by commercial insurers when establishing rates for insur-
ance premiums:
(1) the proportionate part of the total predicted cost of meeting
specified types of losses in the ventures that have been grouped by
the insurer into a “pool of risks,” (2) appropriate amounts for a re-
serve fund in the event the total risk was underestimated, (3) the
administrative costs of the insurer, (4) other expenses of doing
business (including fees for sales representatives such as agents and
brokers), and (5) profits for companies engaging in insurance as a
business enterprise.96
So, in reality, subrogation is not accounted for in the formulation of
insurance premiums, and justifiably so, since “the conjectural and
remote nature of subrogation militates against its inclusion as a fac-
tor for consideration in the setting of premium rates.”97 Although
legitimately excluded from the actuarial calculations, allowing subro-
gation provides an illegitimate windfall to the insurance company.
In the truest sense, then, allowing subrogation by a health in-
surer guarantees a double recovery on the part of the insurer. Even
when paying for an insured’s damages caused by a third party, insur-
ers still remain profitable, or maintain one “recovery” due to the
payment of insurance premiums. Subrogation provides the potential
of additional profits, or a double recovery, each time an insured is
injured by a third-party tortfeasor. Again, the purpose of this note is
not to make a general argument against health insurer subrogation,
although many have.98 The simple plea of this note, and of all injured
insureds, is to let them at least be made whole, or recover once, be-
fore a health insurance conglomerate is allowed to pad its bottom
line through the double recovery windfall of subrogation.
C. The Reality of Subrogation
After the foregoing discussion of the theoretical underpinnings
of subrogation, this note will take a brief look at the contextual real-
95. Id.
96. Baron, supra note 3, at 244 n.44 (quoting ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS,
INSURANCE LAW § 1.3(b)(2) (1988)).
97. Id.
98. See id.
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ity of subrogation. In most instances, an injured policyholder does
not face the prospect of a double recovery due to the extent of his or
her injuries and the limitations of the tortfeasor’s insurance cover-
age.99 In most large cases, an injured insured pays a contingency fee
of thirty-three to forty percent for legal representation. Then, be-
cause of insurance policy limitations, aversion to litigation, financial
need, or other reasons, cases are often settled for considerably less
than the amount needed to make the victim whole. Additionally,
third-party tortfeasors sometimes use the existence of collateral
sources such as health insurance to negotiate a lower settlement
amount.
Finally, the threat of subrogation itself hinders the settlement
process. Tortfeasors may slacken their efforts to settle cases when
subrogation clauses create questions as to whether an insured has the
authority to release the tortfeasor from all other claims, or con-
versely, health insurers may be tardy in paying first party claims in
hopes that the insured will recover from the tortfeasor.100 Also, in
cases where multiple insurers make subrogation claims, the waters of
settlement negotiations are muddied, and a significant additional
hurdle is placed in an insured’s pathway to recovery.
Current federal case law harmoniously concurs, to the detriment
of injured insureds, that language such as “this subrogation clause
supercedes the make whole doctrine” is sufficient to grant first-dollar
priority to health insurers over an injured insured who still has not
been made whole. Although ERISA provides discretion to plan ad-
ministrators and does not prescribe parameters for plan language,
current case law provides unbridled power to health plans to merci-
lessly leave injured insureds in a less-than-whole state, simply by in-
cluding specific language abrogating the make whole doctrine. Per-
haps the most insidious characteristic of this standard is that an
insured really is left unprotected against health plan contract lan-
guage. As a matter of practical reality, it is unlikely that many in-
sureds read the fine print of cumbersome 100-page summary plan
descriptions. Even if they do, they are left with the choice of accept-
ing the language as is or being left without insurance coverage.101
99. See supra text accompanying notes 35-83.
100. See Baron, supra note 3, at 245-46.
101. See, e.g., Cagle v. Bruner, 112 F.3d 1510 (11th Cir. 1997).
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D. A Vote for Federal Common Law Adoption of the Make Whole
Doctrine
Considering the interests of the three major subrogation play-
ers—the health insurer, the injured insured, and the tortfeasor—
three hypothetical scenarios represent the spectrum of possible
solutions to subrogation cases after an insured is injured by a third-
party tortfeasor.
In the first hypothetical situation, the health insurer pays for the
insured’s medical bills, the insured is made whole, and because the
insured is made whole, the tortfeasor does not have to pay. Under
this scenario, the health insurer and the injured insured received just
treatment, but the tortfeasor unjustly escapes accountability.
In a second scenario, the health insurer pays for the insured’s
medical bills, the tortfeasor pays until all available funds are ex-
hausted, and the insured still is not made whole yet is required to
reimburse the health insurer out of the insufficient recovery received
from the tortfeasor. In this instance, the health insurer pays nothing
on the claim while retaining the insured’s premiums. The result is
that the tortfeasor has essentially met his or her obligation to the
extent possible, but the health insurer is enriched by the reimburse-
ment to the detriment of the injured insured who is still left without
full compensation.
Finally, in a third hypothetical situation, the health insurer pays
for the insured’s medical bills, the tortfeasor pays until available
funds are exhausted, the insured is still not made whole by the sum
of both payments, so the insurer keeps the premiums and pays out
on the insured’s policy without reimbursement. This scenario pro-
vides for the tortfeasor to meet his responsibility as far as he is able,
the health insurer to pay out claims for which it has already received
premiums, and the insured to receive funds from all possible sources.
Clearly, this final scenario is the only setting in which justice is
served. As discussed above, no plausible justification exists for al-
lowing subrogation claims in cases where an insured has not been
made whole from a tortfeasor-caused injury. ERISA does not require
it, and, in fact, such a scenario actually belies the underlying intent of
ERISA. The answer is simpler than the sum of adjudicative discourse
has indicated. A nationwide adoption of the make whole doctrine
deals most equitably with the health insurer, the injured insured, and
the third-party tortfeasor. Despite any plan language explicitly dis-
posing of the make whole doctrine, the doctrine should govern cases
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where a health insurer has paid claims on an injury sustained by an
insured at the hands of a third-party tortfeasor. Until an insured is
properly compensated for his or her injuries, monies received from a
third-party tortfeasor should be kept safe from the inequitable grasp
of subrogation claims by health insurers.
V. CONCLUSION
In summary, current case law allows ERISA health insurers to be
refunded even when an injured insured has not been sufficiently
compensated for damages resulting from the act of a third-party
tortfeasor. The make whole doctrine, barring subrogation until an
injured party has been “made whole,” has been allowed by some cir-
cuits in situations where insurance plan language does not explicitly
override the doctrine. In light of the highly questionable rationale
for the existence of health insurer subrogation, the lack of guidance
from ERISA itself, and the windfall for health insurers at the expense
of its own insured, adoption of the make whole doctrine on a federal
level will insure that all interested parties receive equitable treatment.
Most importantly, consistent application of the make whole doctrine
will guarantee that insurance premiums will more frequently buy an
ally than an adversary, and that insurance company subrogation
rights will not be valued more highly by the legal system than the
rights of suffering injured insureds who, as a result of tortfeasor-
caused injuries, are often left in physically and financially devastating
circumstances.
David M. Kono
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